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POORER BUT WISER: THE BAR LOOKS BACK
AT ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE
IMPEACHMENT SPECTACLE
H. Richard Uviller*
INTRODUCTION
T is hardly surprising that lawyers often find themselves at the cen-
ter of controversy, public as well as private. We seek controversy,
thrive on it, and sometimes make it where we can find none waiting
for us. We are not drawn to controversy to perpetuate it, like Jarn-
dyce and Jarndyce,' into a grotesque; nor are we drawn to it for the
love of controversy as such (though there are surely those among us
who think a well-joined issue is a thing of beauty) any more than a
plumber is drawn to a leaky pipe because he loves leaky pipes.
Rather, we are often in the vicinity of conflict because we-and oth-
ers-believe we can reduce, relieve, or resolve the matter in conten-
tion. In the department I know best, criminal law, resolution is fre-
quently achieved by knock-down, drag-out fight-or at least the
armed and credible threat of it. Some litigating lawyers may love the
forum, love the fight, and even love the negotiation in the corridors of
the Coliseum. But the lawyers' job is always to end the struggle, not
to struggle on.
Regularly, the controversy attracts considerable public attention,
and the roving spotlight of media interest comes around brightly to
illuminate the Lawyer-the visible, the active, the vocal, and in some
poses, the mastermind of the operation. The matter in dispute lights
up tubes across the land, and frequently the lawyers are on prominent
display, as both participants and commentators, until the viewers be-
gin to wonder, is this a lawyers' show? Particularly from the pro-
tracted, the painful exposure to media campaigns of saturation plus,
the public-nausea rising-generally emerge asking themselves:
Can't we do something to control our appetite? Even the media ask:
Did we do something wrong? And the Bar echoes: Are we to blame?
How many such searching inquiries followed the prosecution of O.J.
Simpson? Or similar media picnics serving local fare? I remember
the post-mortems in the ebb tide of Watergate. Because so many law-
* Arthur Levitt Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law.
1. See Charles Dickens, Bleak House 3-7 (Oxford University Press 1956) (1853).
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yers seemed to be involved in that presidential fiasco,2 law schools be-
gan beefing up their offerings in Professional Responsibility-or
making some feeble effort to do so-as though teaching law students
the demands of professional ethics would avert future lawyer-
presidents, and their legions of lawyer-associates, from conducting
and covering up politically inspired burglaries.
Now, as we emerge, limping, from the ordeal of the Lewinsky caper,
the pathetic presidential effort to conceal it, and the circus impeach-
ment that followed, it is fitting that we ask again: Are there any en-
during lessons for the Bar that might be useful in our perennial proj-
ect of self-improvement? For, smug as I am sure we appear to many
of our fellow citizens, lawyers are gnawed by self-doubt. From our
first lean days as law students to our well-upholstered retirement, we
lawyers ask ourselves: Why do the people persistently mistrust and
resent us? Are we contributing somehow to the general impression
that we do more harm than good in the world (which we know to be
false)? What can we do to convey to those beyond our satisfied clien-
tele that we are generally earnest of purpose, conciliatory by nature,
and the source of sound advice and sturdy assistance?
This Special Issue is a welcome opportunity to share some thoughts
and reflections on the national grief and outrage that is only beginning
to recede. I, for one, will resist the temptation to analyze the blame-
the-lawyers inclination in the body politic. And I have scant appetite
to explore the uneasy symbiosis of lawyer and news reporter. Rather,
this essay seeks lessons for three branches of the Bar, branches where
I think the national scandal has most pertinence. The essay dowses
for latent instruction, if any, to enlighten: the ordinary public prose-
cutor (Part I); the government lawyer as counselor to government of-
ficials (Part II); and the private lawyer representing a public official
(Part III). The Article concludes that special prosecutors, not Inde-
pendent Counsel, should investigate alleged wrongdoing of high gov-
ernment officials and that government lawyers, because their first
duty is to the public, cannot provide confidential counseling to a gov-
ernment official as client. Finally, I conclude that a private lawyer's
responsibility to his client goes beyond advice; he should urge his cli-
ent to do the right thing. In truth, I don't have much to contribute to
this project beyond my own reflections from the sidelines, assisted to
some small extent by a taste of experience and much cogitation. But I
shall try, nevertheless, to make some sense of it all.
2. See Jerome J. Shestack, The Independent Counsel Act: From Watergate to
Whitewater and Beyond-Foreword: The Independent Counsel Act Revisited, 86 Geo.
L.J. 2011, 2013 (1998) ("Public confidence in the government and in the legal profes-
sion was shaken, since virtually all of the actors, including the President, were law-
yers.").
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I. THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
To the public prosecutor, I say first: Relish your crowded docket;
be grateful for the multiple and diverse demands upon your attention.
Do not curse your stretched budget, your short-handed staff, or the
tide of new cases perpetually lapping at your beach. These constraints
help teach you and your staff the fine faculty of judgment. In the con-
scientious prosecutor's office, the urgency and the variety of ordinary
business present competing opportunities, and often on various coor-
dinates of importance. Both selecting a target for pursuit and simply
sorting out for prosecution, the harvest of the daily tide afford the
prosecutor the obligation of choice. The discharge of that responsi-
bility instructs the public officer that, while all cases standing alone
are of prime importance, taken together some must yield to others.3
Prosecutors frequently use the phrase "the interests of justice"; it is
not a purely rhetorical expression. Its discernment is part of the daily
job of the prosecutor-and it must be learned the hard way. The art
of triage is essential in the development of the sense of justice, it turns
out, and no decent prosecutor can survive without it.
One of several troublesome things I learned from contemplating the
work of the Office of the Independent Counsel ("OIC") is that it
seemed to proceed without the enforced cultivation of judgment.4 I
say nothing of Kenneth Starr as an individual or as the Independent
Counsel ("IC"). While some of his personal decisions may seem ques-
tionable, I have no reason to think that as a judge or as Solicitor Gen-
eral, he was anything but a perfectly honorable man. But he never ran
a prosecutor's office. He was dropped into his role as IC without ba-
sic training in separating the important from the trivial.5 He may well
have composed a staff that, compared to the lynch mob that investi-
gated Richard Nixon, was a model of bipartisan balance. But, by rea-
son of the statute that empowered them, this team had a mission.
Beware, say I in my conservative mode, of the missionaries. The IC
3. Philip B. Heymann makes much the same point in Four Unresolved Questions
About the Responsibilities of an Independent Counsel, 86 Geo. L.J. 2119, 2120 (1998)
("Independent counsels are different from ordinary prosecutors because they lack the
practical pressures and institutional standards ordinarily operating to guide the exer-
cise of prosecutorial discretion."). Heymann served as Deputy Attorney General and
Associate Special Prosecutor in the Watergate investigation. See id. at 2119.
4. I am principally indebted, as succeeding citations will testify, to Georgetown
Professor Julie R. O'Sullivan, formerly on the staff of both Robert B. Fiske, Jr. and
Kenneth Starr, for enlightening my contemplation of this esoterica. It should be
noted, however, that the electronic shelves groan under the academic output gener-
ated by the Independent Counsel experiment. I could not, and do not, propose to at-
tempt here to provide a survey of this literature.
5. Julie O'Sullivan, in The Independent Counsel Statute.: Bad Law, Bad Policy,
33 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 463, 484 (1996) puts it this way: "The constraints upon re-
sources generally available to 'normal' federal prosecutors ensure that the criminal
process will be effectively reserved for egregious violations in which criminal rather
than civil prosecution is clearly appropriate."
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carried many portfolios: Whitewater, Travelgate, the death of Vin-
cent Foster, Hillary's law firm billing practices, and heaven knows
what else. But is there any doubt that the principal target, first and
last, was Bill Clinton? There is something pernicious per se about a
collection of highly motivated lawyers, answerable to no one, with
limitless time and money to spend, charged with the single object of
getting the President.6
The birth of the OIC was perfectly understandable.7 In the wake of
Watergate, we realized that a conspiracy to pervert justice centered in
the White House could easily reach the Department of Justice where,
after all, the Attorney General, according to pre-Clinton tradition, is
likely to be a close companion (if not a relative) of, and trusted politi-
cal advisor to, the President. A special prosecutor, operating out of
the DOJ, responsible-at least nominally-to the authority of the
AG, hardly seems the right person to trust to conduct a detached and
vigorous investigation of the Boss's Boss.5 Yet the record of the inde-
pendence and vigor of the DOJ special prosecutors has been notably
good, 9 including the indictment of an incumbent Vice President, Spiro
Agnew.10 But following the Saturday Night Massacre in which the
Nixon White House asserted its ultimate control of the special prose-
cutor, we were bound and determined to create a truly independent
attorney for the investigation and possible prosecution of high execu-
tive officials."
What we didn't fully realize when we designed-and subsequently
revived-the IC law was that, by building a freestanding office around
6. See O'Sullivan, supra note 5, at 491.
7. See The Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994, 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-
599 (1994). The statute was originally enacted as the Ethics in Government Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1867.
8. Cass Sunstein writes:
The original goal of the Independent Counsel Act was simple, laudable, and
entirely appealing: to ensure that the decision whether to prosecute
high-level government officials would not be made by high-level government
officials. In the aftermath of the Watergate scandal, a genuine constitutional
crisis, the Act seemed indispensable as a way of promoting public trust in
government, by giving an assurance that high-level officials would be inves-
tigated by people who were not controllable by their hierarchical superiors.
Cass R. Sunstein, Bad Incentives and Bad Institutions, 86 Geo. L.J. 2267, 2271 (1998).
9. See id. at 2281. Commenting on the success of the system before the enact-
ment of the Independent Counsel Act, Sunstein notes: "The system worked. And
there was no Independent Counsel [A]ct. The true lesson of the Watergate scandal is
that political safeguards and ordinary prosecutors are perfectly sufficient." Id.
10. See O'Sullivan, supra note 5, at 476 n.57.
11. Just how independent the IC actually is under the Act is reflected in the de-
bate over the "good cause" standard for presidential removal of the IC. See John F.
Manning, The Independent Counsel Statute: Reading "Good Cause" in Light of Arti-
cle II, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 1285, 1290-1301 (1999). The standard is frequently viewed as
distancing the IC from executive control. See id. at 1287. Manning offers a "revision-
ist" view. He views the standard as allowing the IC's removal on reasonably debat-
able matters of legal judgment. See id. at 1288.
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a single task, we had deprived our knights of the school of judgment.
Even though many of Starr's troops, unlike their leader, had had bat-
tle experience, the effects of the single-mindedness inherent in the IC
setup could be expected to dull their judgment. Balanced exercise of
discretion requires the daily conflict of multiple obligations. 2
I do think this lesson is paradoxical in a way. As a prosecutor, I
counted caseload as a burden. I longed for the freedom to prosecute
each case as though it were my only obligation. The burden turns out
to be a blessing. A full file cabinet does not dull sensibility and cor-
rupt judgment by the urgency of making dispositions, as I previously
believed. It provides the occasion for learning the difficult business of
making comparative evaluations. And this, I have come to think, is an
important ingredient in the sensible exercise of discretion.13
Another lesson regarding the controlled deployment of the prose-
cutor's discretion is the matter of answerability. In the interest of to-
tal independence, we created a constitutional goblin. Abiding in none
of the constitutional branches, the creature swings free of all political
accountability. Ultimately, of course, the people will judge the work
of the IC. But "ultimately" means (or so one would think) on the ex-
piration of the IC's commission.14 The IC does not stand for re-
election, nor do those who appointed him. No one will have to face
the voters on the strength of the product of the IC's labors. While lib-
erating, the freedom from political accountability may also enhance
the tendency among virtuous prosecutors to self-righteousness.
All good prosecutors, to a greater or lesser degree, suffer from the
occupational hazard of overconfidence in their own rectitude. It's
built into the job. I can report from my fourteen years in a first rate
office that an otherwise modest young prosecutor finds daily confir-
mations of his belief that he and his office are primarily responsible
for justice in the criminal dockets.5 Judges are usually uninformed,
often less than fully alert, and occasionally untrustworthy.16 And the
12. See Sunstein, supra note 8, at 2279-80 (recognizing the baleful effect of the
single mission, even though his emphasis is on the justice-distorting incentives in the
design of the Independent Counsel Act).
13. See id. at 2273. Noting that ordinary prosecutors regularly decide which of the
many violations of law deserve prosecution, Sunstein comments: "This use of prose-
cutorial discretion, it should be emphasized, is a major, if overlooked, safeguard of
liberty under law." Id
14. See O'Sullivan, supra note 5, at 493 (rejecting the efficacy of this sort of post
facto accountability). "If 'accountability' is to mean anything.... it seems to me to
require some degree of ongoing control to address such problems [as potential abuses
and inequities] at the earliest possible moment." Id. at 494.
15. In fact, I did so report shortly after exchanging my badge for a cap and gown.
See H. Richard Uviller, Commentary, The Virtuous Prosecutor in Quest of an Ethical
Standard- Guidance from the ABA, 71 Mich. L. Rev. 1145,1145 (1973).
16. As the husband of a state court judge of general felony jurisdiction, I should
hastily note that I am not at present intimately acquainted with any judges of this de-
scription.
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defense bar? Even among the few who would qualify for praise from
the prosecutor, not one has the slightest interest in justice-except in
those rare cases where they represent innocent clients. That leaves
the prosecutor, a lawyer without a client, a public servant answerable
only to law and conscience. This worthy may be a knight of justice,
but let us be candid, is this not a creature susceptible to arrogance? I
cannot know how far the political process, the censorious constitu-
ency, serves to stem abuses of authority resulting from prosecutorial
arrogance. But experience with the OIC has taught that some form of
political control is a balancing force.
Once again, I sense a lurking paradox in this observation. In the
prosecutor's office in which I worked and learned the ropes, political
considerations were deemed a blight. Politicians were the subjects of
our investigations, not our moral mentors. Politics bred corruption;
principle was anathema to the political animal, or so I thought. How
can it be that the integrity of the IC suffers from the severance of all
political ties?
The release must be that it is not the immediate ties of prosecutor
with political figures, pursuing their own agendas, that keeps the
prosecutor's swollen self-regard under control. Rather, it is the sense
of an attentive constituency in the background, a critical public with
whom the prosecutor maintains a distant fiduciary obligation. The
likelihood may be remote that an active local prosecutor will be dis-
lodged at the next election, or that the appointing authority-or the
party of the appointing authority-will suffer at the polls because of
some lapse of judgment in the prosecutor's office. Still, I can attest
that ordinary prosecutors are civic republicans at heart. They have a
strong sense that they are contributing their skills to the improvement
of their environs, and that they are serving a constituency faithfully by
doing what the people expect them to do. It is a political process of
the mind, largely, but reinforced by the actual process in which they
may be more or less actively involved from time to time.
It is hard to know the extent to which the political independence
granted to the OIC ironically undermined the sense of responsibility
of that office. It may well be that Ken Starr or others in the office had
a sufficiently strong sense of connection, of participation with a con-
stituency in a larger political process, that their lack of actual account-
ability was a negligible factor. But it does seem to me that one of the
lessons for prosecutors is: remember you are part of a political proc-
ess in which you are, in some manner, answerable to the people you
serve.
To make the implicit explicit, and to recognize that not all share my
underlying assumptions, I should say that these lessons are derived
from my belief that the OIC made serious errors of judgment in its
pursuit of the President. I do not here refer to the several tactical de-
cisions that might have been faulted as overzealous such as: the
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prosecutors' handling of Monica Lewinsky when she appeared for in-
terrogation; the subpoena to her mother; the instruction to Linda
Tripp secretly (and illegally) 17 to record her conversations with
Monica; the failure to ask Betty Currie whether Clinton had ever
asked her to testify falsely; etc. Whether these or uther such incidents
occurred, and whether they manifested overreaching may be debat-
able. But they are not far removed from what any earnest and
overzealous prosecutor may do in the investigation of an important
case. Wrong, perhaps, but only as a matter of degree, and-it seems
to me-not the result of any inherent weakness of the OIC setup.
Rather, I refer to the IC's most grievous and pervasive error of
judgment: over-rating his case. In the mis-assessment, the IC lost the
critical sense of appropriate proportion; distorting a minor, if adoles-
cent, sexual transgression into a cause for removal from office. It all
began with a naive decision by the Supreme Court-none of whose
members had had litigation experience-that proceeding with discov-
ery in the Paula Corbin Jones lawsuit would not seriously interfere
with the President's daily discharge of his public responsibilities."s So
he was deposed, but it was not your ordinary deposition. For one
thing, there was a judge, Susan Webber Wright, presiding.19 For an-
other, she participated by providing a definition-a rather peculiar
definition-of a critical term, a noteworthy articulation that would
shape all that was to follow.' Third, the judge made rulings on rele-
vancy that were, to my ear, odd and inconsistent.
Let me take a closer-if brief-look at these peculiarities and their
amplification in subsequent events. Just how Judge Susan Webber
Wright came to preside at a pretrial deposition of a party to a civil
lawsuit is unclear.2' But she did provide a definition of the term sex-
ual relations that was binding on the parties for the purposes of the in-
terrogation.' Of course, as I understand the ground rules, counsel
17. Taping is illegal in the state of Maryland (where it occurred) without the con-
sent of both parties. See Md. Code Ann., Cis. & Jud. Proc. § 10-402 (1973); Adams v.
State, 406 A.2d. 637, 642 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979). Under federal law, one con-
senting conversant takes the recording out of the category of eavesdropping. See 18
U.S.C. § 2511 (1994). Perhaps the IC, ignorant of the local law, thought himself on
solid ground. Still, the upshot was that a private and frightened citizen, Linda Tripp,
was required not only to violate the obligations of personal loyalty, but the law of the
jurisdiction.
18. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 691-92,705 (1997).
19. See Jones v. Clinton, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1118,1121 (E.D. Ark. 1999).
20. See id. at 1121 n.5; infra note 22.
21. Depositions are normally taken before a clerk or a person appointed by the
court and empowered to administer the oath. See Fed. 1R Civ. P. 28(a).
22. She defined "sexual relations" as follows: "For the purposes of this deposition,
a person engages in 'sexual relations' when the person knowingly engages in or
causes... contact with the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks of
any person with an intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person." Jones,
36 F. Supp. 2d at 1121 n.5.
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were under no obligation to restrict their questions to the employment
of this defined term.' The President's responses, however, were con-
tinually framed in terms of sexual relations.24 The definition appeared
to be limited to sexual interaction that had as its purpose the gratifica-
tion of the other person.' On this understanding-technical but not
unwarranted-Clinton answered, and continued thereafter to insist,
that he had not had sexual relations with Lewinsky. 6 It seems likely
that any other prosecutor, viewing this answer in light of the ambigu-
ity of the controlling judicial ruling, would conclude that he could
never convince a petit jury that, beyond a reasonable doubt, the an-
swer was intentionally false, though perhaps intentionally misleading.
Even an intentionally false statement does not amount to the fed-
eral crime of perjury unless it concerns a material matter.27 At this
stage, remember, President Clinton is being deposed on an alleged in-
cident in a hotel room between himself and Paula Jones while he was
Governor of Arkansas. The question he falsely answered at the depo-
sition concerned sexual interactions between himself' and Monica
Lewinsky years later in the White House. How is the matter elicited
by these questions material to the issues in the Jones lawsuit? Those
who have not studied the Federal Rules of Evidence might be
tempted to say the Lewinsky business revealed a sexual predator with
weak judgment or control, or went to prove a pattern of seductive
conduct likely to be repeated. Maybe so, but those familiar with the
Federal Rules-and, in particular, Rule 404(a)-know that character
is inadmissible to show that this is just the sort of thing a person like
that would do. 8 Even if one-or more than one-prior, unrelated in-
The definition allowed the President, there and later before a grand jury, steadfastly
to deny that he had engaged in the sexual relations-thus defined-with Monica
Lewinsky. See id. at 1129-30.
23. Indeed, the President was asked if he had ever had an "extramarital sexual
affair" or "sexual relationship" with Monica Lewinsky. See id. at 1129-30. The presi-
dent answered he had not. See id.
24. When asked at his January 17th deposition if he had had an "extramarital sex-
ual affair" with Monica Lewinsky, the President's answer was, "I have never had sex-
ual relations with Monica Lewinsky." Id. at 1129. During his August 17th grand jury
appearance, the President continually refused to answer questions concerning any
specific sexual activity with Monica Lewinsky. See id. at 1130. He stated "'sexual rela-
tions' as defined by himself and 'most ordinary Americans' means, for the most part,
only intercourse." Id. The President concluded "he did not engage in intercourse...
[or] any other contact.., that would fall within the definition of 'sexual relations'
used at his deposition." Id.
25. The President stated that he had not had "sexual relations" with Monica
Lewinsky because he had not engaged in "directly touching those parts of her body
with the intent to arouse or gratify." Id.
26. See id.
27. See 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1994).
28. Rule 404(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides in pertinent part:
"[e]vidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not admissible for the
purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion .... " Fed.
R. Evid. 404(a).
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cident establishes a pattern, patterns to prove propensity to prove the
conduct at issue are clearly (if counter-intuitively) excluded. In fact,
Judge Wright correctly ruled that the answers to the Lewinsky ques-
tions would be inadmissible in the trial of the Jones case.29
Can a false answer to a question impermissible under the Rules of
Evidence be material? Judge Wright also ruled (erroneously, I
thought) that the question was nevertheless allowed at the deposition
because the Rules of Evidence do not apply at pre-trial discovery.3
True, but there are limits at discovery too. A question may not be
asked at discovery if there is little chance that it will lead to admissible
evidence 3 Since the whole Lewinsky affair was inadmissible at the
Jones trial, it is hard to see how the question at issue might discover
admissible evidence. The point of all this is merely to note that a fed-
eral prosecutor without the IC's peculiar commission might well hesi-
tate to indict for perjury under these circumstances. While some have
argued that a "high crime or misdemeanor" need not be a criminal of-
fense, an unindictable disingenuous attempt to conceal shameful pri-
vate behavior hardly seems to fill the bill.
Of course, the President also made several other denials outside the
blurry scope of this definition of sexual relations, which seem patently
false.31 For example, the President initially stated that he did not re-
member ever being alone with Monica Lewinsky in the Oval Office.
On a follow-up question he did admit, "It's possible that she [Monica
Lewinsky], in, while she was working there [Oval Office] brought
something to me and that at the time she brought it to me, she was the
only person there. That's possible."3 3 But these denials somehow did
not make it to the status of impeachable perjury when the IC ren-
dered his report to Congress.
The alleged perjury that gave Congress the most trouble (when the
matter arrived in that august forum) concerned the President's testi-
mony before a federal grand jury where, essentially, he reiterated his
sworn statements at the Jones deposition? The IC's use of the grand
29. See Jones, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 1122 n.7.
30. Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent
part: "The information sought [by deposition] need not be admissible at the trial if
the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of ad-
missible evidence." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). This language may be contrasted with
Rule 30(c), which provides that, with two trivial exceptions, examination and cross-
examination of witnesses by deposition "may proceed as permitted at the trial under
the provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence." Fed. R Civ. P. 30(c).
31. See Fed. R Civ. P. 26(b)(1); see also Food Lion, Inc. v. United Food & Com-
mercial Workers Int'l Union, 103 F.3d 1007, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (stating that "[no
one would suggest that discovery should be allowed of information that has no con-
ceivable bearing on the case.") (quoting 8 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice
and Procedure § 2008 (2d ed. 1994)).
32. See Jones, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 1121-22.
33. Id at 1127-28.
34. See Office of the Independent Counsel, Referral to the United States House
1999]
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jury as an aid to investigation is, of course, exactly what any prosecu-
tor would do. The grand jury provides the essential tools for compel-
ling evidence from reluctant witnesses: subpoena and immunity.
However, where an ordinary prosecutor puts evidence before the
grand jury-compels evidence before the grand jury-it is with the
object of eventually charging someone with a crime. At least as con-
cerns the President, his prime target, it is probably fair to say that the
OIC had no intention of seeking an indictment. Why, then, the grand
jury and testimony under oath?
A grand jury is the customary-and in the case of federal felonies,
the constitutionally necessary-means for establishing the underlying
support for a criminal accusation. But there is nothing in the Consti-
tution or statute that requires that preliminary inquiry into grounds
for impeachment adduce sworn evidence or obtain the grand jury im-
primatur. In a sense, then, the setting in which the second, and some
would say graver, presidential perjury took place was gratuitous. Of
course, the Nation's Chief Magistrate should not lie under oath to a
grand jury (nor should anyone else). But, if the grand jury proceeding
was itself an inessential ornament on the IC's mandate to investigate
charges that might amount to impeachable offenses, a false statement
to that body may not be material to the investigation by the IC.
Apart from these considerations, an ordinary prosecutor would
never have called a suspected wrongdoer before a grand jury unless
the prosecutor was prepared to grant that person immunity in ex-
change for testimony against some other target. The prosecutor
would expect that his witness, if implicated, will assert the privilege of
silence. While it was unlikely that the President would refuse to an-
swer questions on grounds of possible self-incrimination, it was also
unlikely that he would furnish incriminating evidence against himself.
It also seems unlikely that the IC hoped to get evidence from the
President to furnish the basis for bringing a criminal indictment
against someone else-his secretary, Betty Currie, or his buddy,
Vernon Jordan, for example. Rather, the President was called in the
expectation that he would persist in his pathetic attempt to conceal his
sexual transgression-and thereby accord a predicate for an accusa-
tion of perjury or obstruction of justice. This sort of perjury trap is
certainly not unknown in the annals of law enforcement.35 But it is a
device of last resort, the propriety of which might be deemed dubious,
of Representatives Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 595(c), H.R. Doc. 105-310 (2d. Sess. 1998),
reprinted in [Forum ed. 1998] at 15.
35. In the ordinary case, of course, the pejury trap is sprung on the suspected
malefactor against whom substantive evidence has failed to materialize (or, in the
classic Alger Hiss case, prosecution on the substantive charge is barred by the statute
of limitations). See United States v. Hiss, 107 F. Supp. 128, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). If the
witness declines-as expected-to fill the gap in the evidence against him, he is im-
munized and the questions narrow, eliciting denials that can be disproved.
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especially where there is no substantive evidence against the target. I
would hope the ethical prosecutor in the ordinary course would scru-
ple to bring an otherwise respectable figure before a grand jury only
to try to elicit the basis for a criminal charge from his efforts to protect
himself in his testimony against a baseless-or imaginary-accusation.
So I must conclude that serious errors of judgment were made by
the IC's office that appear to be the direct result of the unique struc-
ture of its responsibility-free of the constraints of constituency and
the tempering influence of a multi-dimensional docket. I concede that
any person or agency investigating possible impeachment of a Presi-
dent might develop a headlong mentality, a determination to find
some basis for accusation. But the peculiar mission of the tIC, and
the questionable calls it produced, teaches that we had better leave
prosecutorial judgment to prosecutors-those who have had, by virtue
of the diverse demands of their office, fuller opportunity to develop
the sensitivity to make the delicate assessments required by the inter-
ests of justice.36
II. THE GOVERNMENT LAWYER AS COUNSEL TO A PUBLIC
OFFICIAL
From time to time a government lawyer may be called upon to give
legal counsel to a public official. An agent of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation may consult with a lawyer in the Office of Legal Counsel
on the legality of paying a foreign agent for information regarding an
investigation of international terrorism. A bureaucrat may discuss
with agency counsel some irregularities in accounting for disburse-
ments. Insofar as the communications between the two concern offi-
cial business, they may be protected against future disclosure by ex-
ecutive privilege.3 7 Occasionally, the conference may have more to do
with the exposure of the official's personal affairs than with govern-
ment operations. In addition to whatever protection the government
operations privilege may afford, to what extent are the communica-
tions between the two-as conversations between lawyer and client-
under the broad umbrella of the lawyer-client privilege?
The most obvious example of this quasi-professional relationship
36. See Richard A. Posner, An Affair of State 265 (1999) (stating that "we do not
need an independent counsel law").
37. The scope of executive privilege is unclear post-Watergate. See Dawn John-
sen, Executive Privilege Since United States v. Nixon: Issues of Motivation and Ac-
commodation, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 1127, 1141 (1999) (stating that Nixon's actions com-
promised the privilege); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, A Critical Comment on the
Constitutionality of Executive Privilege, 83 Minn. L Rev. 1143, 1185 (1999) (advancing
the debate on the scope of executive privilege by offering reasons for questioning the
privilege's constitutionality); Mark J. Rozell, Executive Privilege and the Modem
Presidents: In Nixon's Shadow, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 1069, 1072 (1999) (stating that a re-
establishment of executive privilege based on constitutional original intent rather
than through statute is warranted).
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can be found in the confidences exchanged between the President and
the official bearing the exalted title: Counsel to the President. On the
Summer Solstice of 1996, in connection with the so-called Whitewater
investigation, the OIC directed a grand jury subpoena to the White
House demanding production of "[a]ll documents created during
meetings attended by any attorney from the Office of Counsel to the
President and Hillary Rodham Clinton (regardless whether any other
person was present). 38 Although the White House could identify
nine sets of documents subject to the subpoena, it refused to produce
them, citing executive privilege, attorney-client privilege, and the at-
torney work product doctrine.39 Two months later, the OIC moved to
compel production of two sets of documents.40 The first set consisted
of notes taken by Associate Counsel to the President a year earlier at
a meeting attended by Mrs. Clinton, Special Counsel to the President,
Jane Sherburne, and Mrs. Clinton's personal attorney, David Ken-
dall.41 The subject of this meeting was Mrs. Clinton's activities fol-
lowing the death of Deputy Counsel to the President, Vincent W. Fos-
ter, Jr.42 The documents in the second set comprised notes taken by
Special Counsel Sherburne during meetings attended by Mrs. Clinton,
Mr. Kendall, Nicole Seligman (Mr. Kendall's partner), and, occasion-
ally, John Quinn, Counsel to the President.43 The meetings, which
took place both during and immediately after Mrs. Clinton's testi-
mony before a Washington, D.C. grand jury,44 addressed the possibil-
ity of discovery of certain Rose Hill billing records in the White
House living area.45
The White House refused to produce the requested documents, re-
lying exclusively on the attorney-client privilege and the work product
doctrine.46 Hillary Rodham Clinton personally appeared to assert her
own attorney-client privilege.47 The District Court did not consider
the question of whether the asserted privilege was available to the
White House, but quashed the subpoenas, in effect, on the grounds
that Mrs. Clinton's reasonable belief that the conversations were
privileged, though erroneous, brought the privilege to bear.48 The
38. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 913 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 521 U.S. 1105 (1997).
39. See id. at 913-14.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 914, 923. The Court of Appeals reversed this conclusion, stating that
it knew of "no authority, and Mrs. Clinton has cited none, holding that a client's be-
liefs, subjective or objective, about the law of privilege can transform an otherwise
unprivileged conversation into a privileged one." Id. at 923.
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Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, unsealing their opinion on
the motion of the parties, took up the question the District Court had
shunned: whether an entity of government can assert the attorney-
client privilege.4 9 They began by finding that, under federal common
law, a governmental creature does enjoy an attorney-client privilege,
albeit somewhat truncated where the privilege would interfere with
the fact-gathering obligations of another agency, especially in a crimi-
nal case.0 At a loss for persuasive authority, the court resorted to
general principles as enunciated by Wigmore, no friend of the privi-
leges.51 Looking to Wigmore for the basic principles defining the
common law privileges, Judge Bowman for the Court of Appeals
adopted a scheme in which the duty to furnish evidence in a criminal
investigation figures prominently, while the privileges are read as nar-
rowly as possible.' In one notable passage, the court wrote: "We also
find it significant that executive branch employees, including attor-
neys, are under a statutory duty to report criminal wrongdoing by
other employees to the Attorney General. Even more importantly,
however, the general duty of public service calls upon government
employees and agencies to favor disclosure over concealment.""
Ultimately, the court held:
Assuming arguendo that there is a governmental attorney-client
privilege in other circumstances, confidentiality will suffer only in
those situations that a grand jury might later see fit to investigate.
Because agencies and entities of the government are not themselves
subject to criminal liability, a government attorney is free to discuss
anything with a government official-except for potential criminal
wrongdoing by that official-without fearing later revelation of the
conversation. An official who fears he or she may have violated the
criminal law and wishes to speak with an attorney in confidence
should speak with a private attorney, not a government attorney. 54
What all this means is that Hillary Clinton, in her own right or as a
representative of the White House (as the court assumed her to be),
was not a client of the government lawyers who advised her, or at
least not a client in the same sense as a person consulting with private
counsel. Consequently, she was not entitled to the full shield of the
attorney-client privilege cloaking confidential communications. The
presence of her personal lawyer at the meeting did not convert it into
the confidential interchange that she claimed it to be. What the deci-
sion connotes-insofar as the majority of the Eighth Circuit Court of
49. See id. at 915.
50. See id. at 915-18.
51. See 8 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2192 (4th
ed. 1961).
52. See Grand Jury Subpoena, 112 F.3d at 913, 918, 920; supra note 51.
53. Id. at 920 (citation omitted); see 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) (1994).
54. Grand Jury Subpoena, 112 F.3d at 921 (emphasis added).
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Appeals is heard outside the Eighth Circuit-is that the law defines
the government lawyer as a law enforcement officer first, and confi-
dential counselor only insofar as his primary allegiance allows.
I heard Bernard Nussbaum, in what he did not then realize were the
waning days of his tenure as Counsel to the President, stand up and
proclaim to a packed house at the Columbia Law School that, in re-
moving files from the office of Vincent Foster immediately after his
suicide, he was doing only what any self-respecting lawyer could have
done to protect the interests of his client, the President of the United
States. He obviously relished the role. The great attorney-client
privilege, he told us, was the right of the President no less than any
private person, and he, as counsel, was the sworn keeper of his client's
confidences. The widely regarded legal ethicist, Professor Stephen
Gillers, took an op-ed column in the New York Times to echo the
same view.55 Both Nussbaum and Gillers-and heaven knows how
many others-were laboring under a misapprehension of the nature of
government service for lawyers, and the public obligations of our es-
sentially private profession in the context of assisting in criminal in-
vestigations.
What I hope rings resoundingly from the Court of Appeals's rather
long and tortuous opinion is the second lesson to the Bar from the
IC's endeavors. A government lawyer, whatever her title, is not like
in-house counsel to a corporation or a private lawyer on retainer to a
busy private client. When a lawyer takes the oath of public service,
she becomes part of the government apparatus, and thereafter she can
no longer assure unconditional loyalty to any individual who consults
her. When entrusted with secrets by another government employee
seeking legal counsel, those confidences are protected only to the ex-
tent they may be by government or executive privilege. The lawyer-
client relationship, such as it might be, is subordinated to the civic re-
sponsibility of the government lawyer.
I hear in the peal of this bell reassuring overtones of old fashioned
civic republican virtue. In our decidedly liberal democracy-which we
justly celebrate-there is still room for collective responsibility. The
lawyer serves her country by heeding the call of this higher duty, even
at the expense of the individual interests of those who seek her advice
in confidence. Lawyers abound in private practice who are encum-
bered by no such public responsibility; as the court rightly says, let the
public official with something to fear from a grand jury consult one of
their number.
III. PRIVATE LAWYERS REPRESENTING PUBLIC OFFICIALS
There were surely a number of lawyers outside the constraints of
55. See Stephen Gillers, Hillary Clinton Loses Her Rights, N.Y. Times, May 4,
1997, § 4, at 15.
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government service who consulted with the President and his wife
throughout their ordeal, to say nothing of the legions of satellite cli-
ents, each helping in his or her small way to fatten the 1040s of the
practicing Bar. Of course, we have no idea-and probably never
will-how they exercised their advisory prerogatives. Fortunately, the
bonds of professional loyalty hold fast. But I think it is possible to
imagine various postures chosen by these lawyers. Perhaps the events
as they became known to the avid consumers of the evening news
hold some message for each of these imagined counseling styles.
A. Passive Deference
Notwithstanding the comparative youth of President and Mrs.
Clinton and their unpretentious manner, I can well understand how a
lawyer--even a grey and distinguished lawyer-might be loath to take
charge of the Clintons' affairs, though the evidence was strong of sur-
prisingly poor judgment on both their parts theretofore. From what I
understand, the mystical reverence for the Oval Office might make it
difficult to take responsibility for the decisions in their case when they
have taken responsibility for making decisions for all Americans in so
many matters of far graver importance. So I think we may imagine a
lawyer who takes a passive role-not in awe but out of respect-stat-
ing matters as plainly as possible, attempting to paint a clear picture
on both sides of every option, but leaving decision to the client.O
I can imagine such a lawyer saying, "Well, Mr. President, (even
Bill), Judge Wright's definition leaves room for interpretation. Read
for its general tenor-and that may be the way most people will read
it-it would seem to include sexual contact of all sorts. But read
strictly, as a lawyer might, it would seem to include only sexual con-
tact intended to impart excitement or gratification. You know best
what actually happened, you're a lawyer, and you can decide which
reading you want to give the definition."
Or later, the passive lawyer may have added, "Well, no one can say
with assurance what Ken Starr has in mind, but if he is looking for a
perjury or obstruction charge against you, it might make things easier
if you changed your story and admitted to the grand jury that you did
not tell the full truth at that Paula Jones deposition. Your testimony
is secret, of course, but we don't know how far we can trust that se-
crecy, or indeed, if you want to rely on it from a public relations
standpoint. On the other hand, perjury is problematic in this case and
the indictment of an incumbent president is contrary to Department
56. I have recently written, in another context, of the issue of the allocation of re-
sponsibility for tactical and strategic decisions between client and counsel. See H.
Richard Uviller, Calling the Shots: The Allocation of Choice Betveen the Accused and
Counsel in the Defense of a Criminal Case, 52 Rutgers L Rev. (forthcoming Apr.
2000) [hereinafter Uviller, Calling the Shots].
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of Justice policy57 and seems unlikely. If you revised your testimony
now that you are before a grand jury it might take some of the steam
out of the impeachment people-or at least they couldn't use your tes-
timony before the grand jury as evidence of sworn deception, insofar
as that may be a high crime or misdemeanor. It's up to you, sir."
We can easily imagine our balanced, deferential counsel putting all
sorts of choices before the client. Full explanation is given of options
and consequences, but no strong advice on which to choose. Would
that performance satisfy us that fully effective assistance of counsel
had been accorded? 58
B. Assertive Deputy
I'm sure we can also imagine a very different type, a lawyer who
would love to command the Commander-in-Chief. This lawyer, as I
see him, is accustomed to coming into highly fraught, high-stakes
cases, and after fully detailing the grave hazards faced by the client,
saying with welcome assurance: "But rest easy. I am now on the case.
Leave everything to me. I will, I promise you, secure the best possible
outcome for you." It's not just an ego trip. I know lawyers who fer-
vently believe that the best service they can provide for their clients is
to save them from themselves. "My clients have defective judgment
concerning their own interests," I was told. "That's a given. That's
why I'm there. So I make it clear from the start; if they choose me as
their lawyer, they leave the decisions to me." Such a person might
change the line somewhat with the President as a client, I imagine, but
the general approach would be similar. "I'll be frank with you Mr.
President," he might say. "In my opinion this cockamamie lawsuit is
garbage. It's nothing but a stick-up and should be thrown out of
court-which is just what I hope we'll be able to do eventually.
Meanwhile, you owe Paula Jones nothing in return for this harass-
ment, and I would construe all these questions at the deposition as
narrowly as possible. If there's a way to avoid telling the whole story,
you are entitled to take it, and that's just what I would do if I were in
your shoes." Such confidence is frequently persuasive, even if the ad-
vice is poor.
Most lawyers would probably place themselves somewhere in be-
57. See Jeffrey L. Bleich, Executive Privilege and Immunity. The Questionable
Role of the Independent Counsel and the Courts, 14 St. John's J. Legal Comment. 15,
32 (1999) ("Justice Departments under both Democrats and Republicans have taken
the position that a sitting President cannot be indicted."); see also Posner, supra note
36, at 265 ("We do not need to be able to sue our Presidents during their term of of-
fice.").
58. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct defines a "normal client-lawyer re-
lationship" as one that is "based on the assumption that the client, when properly ad-
vised and assisted, is capable of making decisions about important matters." Model
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.14 cmt. 1 (1999).
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tween these prototypes. But I suspect that Clinton's disastrous deci-
sions were in part the result of bad advice from private counsel. Not
that the bad advice was not augmented, compounded, and perhaps
initiated by others: spin doctors, public relations consultants, old
buddies, and their ilk. But in my jurocentric way, I continue to be-
lieve that the lawyers had a central role-and a special responsibility.
So, sailing on suspicion alone, I maintain that the shipwreck of state
taught a bitter lesson for the private counsel of public officials.
The lesson is that lawyers are duty-bound not only to describe to
clients, legal and other constraints bearing on a proposed course of
conduct, to expound on available alternatives and their likely conse-
quences, but to tender their best and most conscientious counsel.5 9
Counsel means advice, not explanation, not command. I do not sug-
gest, I hasten to add, that lawyers are uniquely qualified to read the
tea leaves, and predict the most successful course. But they do have-
or should have-special competence and experience to sort out com-
plex and conflicting considerations, and to evaluate probabilities on a
sound understanding of the big, and evolving, picture. Though the ul-
timate decision may be for the client, the lawyers are duty-bound to
attempt to influence that decision along lines suggested by their own
best professional judgment.
There is, I am aware, a nice and debatable question (on which I
have written elsewhere)60 concerning the allocation of control be-
tween counsel and client. Codes and cases have spoken on the sub-
ject, especially in the context of criminal litigation.6' Schools of
thought have arisen favoring either client autonomy or professional
prerogative. Issues have been parsed according to whether they are
fundamental or instrumental. Ultimately, the matter probably re-
mains quite fluid with individual pairs of lawyers and clients respond-
ing to their particular and various differences in temperament, under-
standing, and concern. Although I favor a few inalienable
entitlements of the client-again, especially in the trial of a criminal
case, I submit that a robust defense and the adequate discharge of the
advisory duty require counsel to take responsibility for decisions, at
least to the extent of exerting persuasive influence on the client's
choice.
The Lewinsky fiasco, then, should have taught the private bar that
their obligation is to advise and persuade. Trusted counsel should
have said to the President in those early days when he desperately
thought he could get away with evasions and concealments of his rela-
59. For an example of this assertive approach, see United States v. Boigegrain, 155
F.3d 1181, 1188 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that it is not ineffective assistance-indeed,
it is counsel's professional duty-to raise with the court the defendant's possible in-
competence despite the defendant's wishes not to do so).
60. See Uviller, Calling the Shots, supra note 56.
61. See id
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tionship with "that woman,". "Mr. President, let me be frank. Yes
there is an interpretation of Judge Wright's definition that would al-
low you to say that fellatio is not having sexual relations. But it is a
very narrow interpretation and contrary to ordinary understanding. If
you rely on it to deny that you had sexual relations with Ms Lewinsky,
someone is sure to say that you are evading the truth and dishonoring
your oath. That person may just possibly be on the IC's staff. You
are going to be required to repeat it, perhaps to the IC's grand jury.
And they, coached by the IC, are going to take a dim view of your
technical and legalistic construction. Wholly apart from what your
public relations people may tell you, I hope to persuade you that you
are buying a heap of legal trouble down the line if you choose this
tack."
For all we know, just such sage advice was imparted to the Presi-
dent, who stubbornly refused to heed it. But to me the President's
counseled error of judgment at the Paula Jones deposition serves to
highlight to the Bar generally the importance not only of sound as-
sessment, but of persuasive presentation to the obstinate and wrong-
headed client.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the Bar has emerged from the impeachment investigation of
1998 and its fallout somewhat sullied in its cloak of wisdom and de-
tachment, though not nearly as badly smeared as following the Water-
gate investigation. Our precious capital as salty captains of conflict
and controversy has been depleted a bit. But, reflecting on the several
lessons of the recent era of the Independent Counsel, I think we might
be the wiser for appreciation of our errors.
So I conclude that there is little the profession can do to avert fu-
ture politically-fueled, legally-entangled, media-enhanced government
scandals, or to control the damage wrought by them on public confi-
dence. I certainly will not recommend beefing up the professional re-
sponsibility offerings at the law schools. But individually we can learn
from the structural flaws and ethical errors that may have contributed
to the impeachment and trial of President Clinton. We do not need,
and should not have, a free-ranging and open-ended prosecutorial
team charged with the single mission of bringing to book a highly visi-
ble target. We should allow investigation of alleged malfeasance in
high places to be conducted by special prosecutors within the De-
partment of Justice under such arrangements as will maximize inde-
pendent judgment. From the experience we have had with such inves-
tigations, we have no reason to fear their corruption. Second, we
should not forget that our government lawyers are bound, first and
foremost, to the public weal, and cannot offer confidential counseling
to public officers concerned about their personal jeopardy. Govern-
ment officers, no less than ordinary citizens, must have recourse to
[Vol. 68
1999] THE BAR AND THE IMPEACHMENT 915
private counsel, with professional bonds of undivided loyalty, to take
the great advantage of the privilege that shields their conversation
from even the most urgent public demand for revelation. Finally, as
private lawyers, we should not shrink from the earnest tender of good
advice, coupled with such persuasion as we can muster to dissuade
even the most illustrious client from the disastrous path. Wise and
prescient as may be our description of the possible consequences of
competing courses of action, vivid as our projections may be, it is not
enough to educate the client. We must, as part of our obligation to
counsel our clients, urge them to do what we have concluded is the
right thing and to shun their inclinations to err.
Notes & Observations
